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1. Financial participation by workers in the European 
Union  
This  paper will examine the current situation and future prospects of 
Italian legislation regarding the financial participation of workers in 
enterprise (in particular in the form of share ownership).   
Although most of the information and observations that follow will 
focus on Italy, some initial reference will be made to evolution within the 
European Community; the increasingly marked influence of EU social law 
on national labour systems
1 makes it inevitable to introduce the topic 
from a European perspective, taking into account the main issues that 
have been raised – and apparently continue to be raised – at a 
Community level.  
From the early 1990s onwards a considerable amount of attention has 
been paid in the EU to the topic of financial participation (henceforward 
referred to as f. p.) by workers;  significant official initiatives have been 
taken by European institutions (in particular the Commission and the 
Council of Europe), and various studies have been conducted by 
important European research institutes, in some cases based on input 
from the institutions themselves 
2. 
Investigation of the topic started wit h  a  f a m o u s  r e p o r t  o n  f .  p .  b y  
workers in EU member states published in 1991 – the so-called PEPPER 
Report ( Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise 
Results in the Member States of the European Community) 
3 – solicited 
by the Commission as preliminary to the 1992 Recommendation (Rec. CE 
92/443, 27
th July 1992) 
4. A second updated version of the Report was 
                                          
(*) The Working paper takes as a starting point the report treated in one of the  seminars 
preliminary to the meeting on “Growth and employment between Europeism and 
localism”(Naples, 3
rd  - 4
th may 2002, which took place at the University of Economics in 
Naples, on the 4
th of April. All the reports can be seen on the Internet page: 
http://www.sole.unina.it/ .  
1 Cf. ARRIGO  (1998), pp. 167 and ff. and, more specifically, on the process of 
“Europeanisation” of Italian labour law, CORSO (1996). 
2 Cf. in particular, two recent studies by the European Foundation for the improvement of 
living and working conditions, Dublin: Recent Trends in Employee Financial Participation in 
the European Union; Employee Share Ownership and Profit Sharing in the European Union, 
both to be found at: http://www.eurofound.ie; also, the study carried out, on the request of 
the Commission, by the  European Centre for Employee Ownership on the connections 
between European  work councils and f. p. by workers (see EWCs and Financial 
Participation, 2001). 
3 UVALIC (1990).  
4  See ALAIMO, 1996; ROCCELLA, 1992; TOSI, LUNARDON, 1992. FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SHARE OWNERSHIP 3 
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issued in 1996 (PEPPER  Report II 
5), and the Commission recently 
resumed the issue with a Working Paper published in July 2001 
6. 
As stated in the introductory pages, the Working Paper  follows in the 
wake of the PEPPER Reports of 1991 and 1996 and the Council of Europe 
Recommendation of 1992 and aims at initiating a process of consultation, 
above all with the social partners, prior to adoption of a future 
Communication by the Commission. 
Whereas the interest shown by EU institutions in f. p. by workers has 
so far led to a simple Recommendation – typical of soft law – in the near 
future it would appear destined to generate a simple Communication: an 
atypical act, the only aim of which is to establish a “line of political action 
or to state the specific position taken by the institutions” 
7.  
Despite the “weak” nature of EU intervention, it is useful to highlight 
the main themes and problems regarding f. p. that appear to be 
emerging. I will refer not only to Commission’s Working Paper but also to 
a recent study carried out on the request of the Commission by the 
European Centre for Employee Ownership 
8, as well as the results of the 
process of consultation with the social partners initiated by the Working 
Paper, which has almost been concluded (UNICE, ETUC and the European 
Federation of shareholding employees – set up in Brussels in 1998 – have 
already supplied the Commission with written observations on the 
Working Paper). 
Two issues in particular seem to emerge from official documents, the 
observations made by the social partners on the Working Paper and the 
study mentioned above.   
A) The first is the transnational spread of f. p. by workers, i.e. its 
spread among multinational groups and in particular in what are called 
Community-scale enterprises. 
The  Working Paper identifies three obstacles to the transnational 
spread of f. p. schemes: a) the different tax systems in the various 
Member States; b) the different compulsory contribution systems; c) 
social and cultural barriers (which the Commission indicates with the 
expression “cultural deficit”) against the spread of f. p. in some States. 
From the study carried out by the European Centre for Employee 
Ownership – a study of f. p. in four large multinational companies (Gucci, 
Pearson,  Air France and DSM),  which specifically investigates the 
connections between financial participation and the activity of European 
                                          
5 PEPPER II, Com (96) 697 final. 
6 Financial  Participation of Employees in the European Union: 27
th  July 2001, SEC (2001) 
1308. 
7 POCAR  (2000), pp. 306-307. 
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Works Councils – it emerges, on the other hand, that only rarely (in 
particular in the case of the Gucci company) is the intention of applying f. 
p. schemes in all the companies in the group the main reason for the 
setting up of the EWC; in most cases, in fact, f. p. has no connection with 
the activity of EWCs: it has not been a subject for discussion within the 
councils, nor have any agreements been stipulated by them regarding 
financial participation. 
The study draws the conclusion, however, that EWCs will in the future 
be a forum in which the modes of application of the various f. p. schemes 
can be discussed, especially if the schemes applied in certain  places are 
to be extended to companies operating in different EU countries. 
From a strictly juridical viewpoint, however, it is obvious that 
homogeneous application of f. p. schemes would require a common 
discipline, a juridical statute (i.e. a single system of rules) within the EU 
system, similar to the single European Company model recently 
introduced by EU Regulation n. 2157/ 2001 
9. 
It is, in fact, evident that only a statute of this kind – adopted via 
action that is directly binding for all Member States – would provide 
transnational enterprise with a uniform set of norms that could be applied 
in all Member States. 
However, as is clear from the direction that EU institutions have taken, 
the orientation is quite the opposite: whereas in the early  ’90s – while 
the 1992 Recommendation was being formulated – the Commission had 
declared its intention of setting up a working group to design a discipline 
at a European level, this has not come about: the Commission has tended 
towards  soft regulatory intervention, more recently passing to the 
planning of initiatives in favour of the adoption of acts (such as the 
announced Communication) that are quite atypical and the only aim of 
which is to establish lines of political action and state the position of 
Community institutions regarding the issue. 
Although the possibility of collective bargaining by EWCs in relation to 
f. p. schemes may respond to the need to create «supranational co-
ordination and connection of collective relationships within a group» 
10, 
for example the co-ordination of  wage policies and/or  “fidelity” policies 
for all the group’s employees, it would not be suitable for the creation of 
a single set of norms to be applied directly to labour relations in all the 
companies in the group. EWC agreements are, in fact, known to have 
                                          
9  Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
company (SE).  
10 GUARRIELLO (1992), p. 32. FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SHARE OWNERSHIP 5 
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compulsory effects and so they are not effective as regards the 
employment relationships of the employees of the companies involved 
11 .  
As regards transnational regulation of f. p. schemes, the most we can 
hope for, then, is the spread of framework agreements, that is, 
bargaining of a policy-oriented nature, leaving implementation of the 
various types of f. p. in the various companies in the group to be 
regulated by current legislation  and possibly collective bargaining at a 
national level. 
 B) The second important issue that is emerging in the EU in relation 
to f. p. is the connection between f. p. and participation in decision-
making processes.  
Participation in decision-making as a necessary consequence of f. p. 
was already outlined in the 1992 Recommendation: both the 
Recommendation itself and the enclosure recommended respect of 
workers’ rights to information, consultation and participation
12. Greater 
emphasis was placed on this connection by the consultation process 
following the 2001 Working Paper. As was to be expected, it was above 
all the ETUC that focused its observations on the profile of worker 
participation and involvement in the enterprise, declaring the indications 
in the Commission’s Working Paper to be inadequate in this respect. They 
specifically requested the future Communication to include explicit 
reference to the right to information and consultation and the 
appointment of workers’ representatives on company boards 
13.  
This is in my opinion an important indication; it points to a trend that 
national legislation would be advised not to ignore. 
 
2. Share ownership by workers: the situation in Italy 
Unlike other EU countries, where ad hoc legislation regarding f. p. was 
introduced some time ago
14, or an organic system of regulation was 
developed following input from the Community
15, the topic of share 
                                          
11 Ead., p. 63. 
12 Rec., point 3, part II; encl. point 2. 
13 The position of  Etuc on the document of the Commission has been transmitted with a 
Communication of  the 23
rd o f  N o v e m b e r ;  i t  c a n  b e  c o n s u l t e d   o n  t h e   I n t e r n e t  p a g e :  
http://home.pi.be/~pin13904/ParticipFinEN.pdf. On the position of Etuc and Unice, see, 
more extensively, TIRABOSCHI (2002), pp. 213-215. 
14 I refer above all to France and Great Britain:  following a legislative tradition of almost 
twenty years, they have recently renewed their legislation on the subject – in 2001 and 
2000 respectively (for the French law, see France: New Law on Employee Participation, 
2001 and for Great Britain law, see http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/shareschemes/).  
15  Belgium, for example, passed its own law on profit sharing and share ownership by 
workers in June 2001 (cf. Belgium Employment - New Governments Draw Up Employment 6                                                        ANNA ALAIMO 
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ownership by employees in Italy is still regulated by outdated laws 
(Articles 2349 and 2441, last paragraph, Italian Civil Code) 
16. Recently 
these have been supplemented by a few sporadic provisions (Art. 13, 
par.1, letter b), n. 2 of Legislative Decree n. 505,  23
rd December 1999, 
which amended Art. 48, par. 2, letter g of the T.U.I.R. on income tax; 
Presidential Decree n. 917, 22
nd December 1986; Arts. 137, par. 3, and 
141, of legislative decree n. 58, 24
th February 1998), all, however, 
lacking in those organic features that adequate legislative regulation 
should by now possess.    
The only two pages devoted to the topic of “economic democracy” 17 in 
the White Paper on the labour market by Minister Maroni 18 had no follow-
up in the labour market Bill ( N° 848) passed in 2001); nor is there any 
hint in Bill N° 2145, 2001 which introduced a reform of compulsory and 
supplementary national insurance contributions, even though legislative 
reference to f. p. by workers has more than once been made in the 
Italian system, in connection with the introduction of norms regulating 
voluntary contributions or reforms of certain aspects of the compulsory 
contribution system 19. 
  As the White Paper states, there has up to now been no organic 
legislation relating to f. p. and share ownership by workers. Although a 
number of bills have been presented in Parliament, from the 12
th 
legislature onwards, no legislation has as yet been passed to deal 
adequately with the numerous issues that the f. p. phenomenon 
interferes with: from its connection with the process of privatisation of 
public enterprise – in relation to which most f. p. schemes in Italy have 
been introduced –; to its link with participation in decision-making 
processes, and in particular the opportunity for shareholding employees 
to take part, with voting powers, in shareholders’ meetings, and the 
                                                                                                           
Agenda, 1999; BLANPAIN, 2002); for recent comparative analyses, see  FERRANTE  (2000); 
FESTING  M., GROENING  Y., KABST  R., WEBER  W. (1999 and 
http://home.pi.be/~pin13904/WHATSNEW.htm; 
http://home.pi.be/~pin13904/THE%20NEW%20EO%20BELGIAN%20LAW.pdf); and for a 
comparison with English law, see GUAGLIANONE (2001). For a comparative analysis of the 
situation in Italy, Great Britain and the U.S.A, focusing on the connection between f. p.  and 
decentralised bargaining, see DEL BOCA, KRUSE, PENDLETON  (1999). 
16 Cf. GHERA, 1997, pp. 11 and ff. 
17 Pp. 86-87. Among the most recent contributions on the topic of economic democracy, see 
BONFANTI, 2001; MARRONCELLI, 2001; FERRARO, 2000; RODOTÀ, 1997. 
18 Libro Bianco sul mercato del lavoro in Italia (White Paper on the Labour Market in Italy), 
October 2001, on which – besides the numerous comments in Italian – see LO FARO (2002). 
19 Cf.  Law N° 299, 17
th August 1999,  concerning the conversion of  lump sum funds into 
stock, subsequently destined for  company retirement pension funds, and suppressed Art. 2, 
par. 15, of Law N° 335, 8
th August 1995, on the notion of taxable income for contribution 
purposes.  FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SHARE OWNERSHIP 7 
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inclusion of their representatives on company boards;  and finally to 
regulation of the modalities of collective stock management 20.  
It is, however, true to say that there have been some signs of 
legislative consideration of the phenomenon in Italy since the second half 
of the ‘90s. But this has been in the form of sporadic legislative 
intervention – provisions with very broad, general spheres of reference. 
Some normative provisions regarding share ownership by employees 
have therefore been inserted in laws whose scope was much broader and 
more general in nature: on the one hand, reforms of the compulsory and 
voluntary pension contributions system and harmonisation of the tax and 
contributions regulations concerning income from subordinate 
employment (Laws N° 335, 1995; 314, 1997; and 505, 1999); on the 
other,  provisions regarding brokerage and listed companies (Law N° 58, 
1998).  
Regulations occasionally inserted in laws with much broader scope 
have thus separately referred to the two different, most typical types of 
impact by f. p.: on the one hand wages and lump sum payments on 
retirement; on the other shareholding worker participation in decision-
making processes. 
 
3. Legislation regarding tax and contribution relief  
As regards the first of the two types mentioned (wages and lump sum 
payments on retirement),  it is worthwhile recalling the sequence of 
provisions which introduced tax and contribution relief for employee 
share ownership schemes between 1995 and 1999 21.  
The outcome of these provisions and subsequent additions has been 
the development of legislation favoura b l e  t o  f .  p .  b y  w o r k e r s .  I t  
comprises a series of promotional regulations – in the form of tax and 
contribution incentives for f. p. schemes – that can be considered as 
complying with the types of law in existence in a number of other EU 
countries (cf., retro, § 2) and the suggestions made in EC   
Recommendation 92/443 regarding financial incentives for f. p.  
The first relief provisions were introduced by Law N° 335, 8
th August 
1995, which enlarged the range of  exemption from contributions, ex Art. 
12, Law N° 153, 1969, excluding from taxable income “the difference 
between the market price of shares in the employing company or 
                                          
20 Of interest on account of the specific consideration given to this profile are the regulations 
proposed by Bill N°. 898, submitted to the Italian Senate by Senator Montagnino and others 
on 28
th November 2001. 
21  DI NUNZIO (2000). 8                                                        ANNA ALAIMO 
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controlling or controlled companies and the reduced price offered to 
employees according to current law (Art. 2, par. 15, Law N° 335, 1995)”. 
This was replaced by new regulations issued in 1997 when, on the 
occasion of unification of the notion of  taxable income for tax and 
contributions purposes (Law N° 314, 1997), it was established that in the 
event of increases in company capital provided for by the only two civil 
code provisions that referred to stock ownership by workers (Arts. 2349 
and 2441) the “value of stock” held by employees was not to be assessed 
as taxable income (either for tax or contribution purposes). The latest 
relief provisions, which are still in force, are those made by Law N° 505, 
1999 which, reformulating Art. 48 of the T.U.I.R., established that 
taxable income was not to include either the value of stock offered to 
employees (up to a total amount not exceeding four million lire in the tax 
year – letter g), or the difference between the value of the stock at the 
moment it was assigned and the amount paid by an employee to 
purchase such stock (letter g bis); this difference – typical of what are 
called stock option schemes – is a lucrative source of income for 
employees who become shareholders. 
 
4.  Share ownership and participation in decision-
making processes. 
The other impact of recent provisions regarding share ownership by 
employees is, as we have seen, the participation of shareholding 
employees in decision-making processes. 
Here again, the few provisions still in force were inserted into 
legislative measures with a broader scope – Law N° 58 (listed company 
reform)  passed by the Government in 1998, familiarly known as the 
“Draghi Reform”. Once more, therefore, legislative reference was due to a 
broader, more general reform, on this occasion concerning listed 
companies. 
Legislative references to this profile (i.e. the participation of 
shareholding employees in decision-making processes) are, however, 
very few; as such, they would appear to confirm certain interpretations 
that undervalue the phenomenon of f. p., according to which one should 
“not make out too close a connection between the problems and 
suggestions of financial participation with those concerning worker 
participation in company management organisms”; these are two 
phenomena that “should be considered and assessed as rigorously FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SHARE OWNERSHIP 9 
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separate and distinct, as there is no immediately consequential link 
between them” 22 .  
Although this can be held to be true as legislation stands today, legal 
policy seems to be developing a different idea, attaching greater value to 
worker participation in decision-making. As seen previously, the EU has 
provided various inputs to promote this profile, and at a national level 
various Bills have been presented to support the connections between f. 
p. and participation by workers in company management. As an example, 
it is worthwhile recalling that one of the most recent and organic Bills 
concerning share ownership by employees – Bill  N° 18, 2001, known as 
the Pizzinato Bill, which was presented during the current legislature – 
states that the primary aim of the proposal is to “allow active 
participation” by workers in the life of the company, in compliance with 
Art. 46 of the Constitution”, thus retracing the idea of participation 
expressed when the Constitution was originally drawn up 23. 
 
5.  Employee participation in shareholders’ meetings 
and associations of shareholding employees.   
The provisions laid down by the above-mentioned T.U. (in particular Arts. 
141 and 137, par. 3) exclusively concern the participation of shareholding 
employees in shareholders’ meetings but not the participation of their 
representatives in other company organisms such as board meetings and 
auditors’ committees (even though the need for the latter was taken into 
account in certain important collective contracts dealing with share 
ownership by employees in the late ‘90s: the 1996 and 1998 Alitalia 
agreements; the Meridiana agreement in 1997; the Dalmine agreement 
in 2000). 
The two provisions made by the T.U. to reform listed companies that 
refer to shareholding employees therefore only deal with shareholders’ 
associations  (Art. 141, which is a general regulation concerning 
shareholders’ associations, thus affording general protection to minor 
shareholders) and the votes that shareholding employees can delegate to 
these associations so as to participate in shareholders’ meetings (Art. 
137, par. 3).  Art. 137, par. 3 establishes in particular that company 
statutes can include provisions to facilitate the collection of votes 
                                          
22 SCHLESINGER, 2000, p. 188. 
23 The same inspiring ratio was behind two recent bills presented by National Alliance 
deputies: Bill 2023 C, submitted to the Chamber on 23
rd November 2001 by the Honourable 
E. Cirielli (AN) and Bill n. 741 S, submitted to the Senate on 12
th October 2001 by Senator 
Pedrizzi (AN). 
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delegated by shareholding employees. The two provisions are, in fact, 
connected; as is clearly seen from the opening of Art. 141, the basic task 
of shareholders’ associations (and thus associations of shareholding 
employees) is to collect proxies so as to allow them to take part and vote 
in meetings via the associations.   
It is obviously not possible here to deal thoroughly with the issues 
involved in delegating votes. It is, however, worthwhile recalling that the 
right to vote – and therefore the “weight” – that shareholding employees 
can exercise in shareholders’ meetings via their associations, has been 
the subject of recent study, evaluation and proposal by a group of 
experts. Following an initial meeting in Genoa on 5
th March 2002, the 
group drew up a Report on “Exercise of the right to vote by shareholding 
employees in the shareholders’ meetings of listed companies”  24. The 
Report is to be examined by the Finance Commission of the Chamber of 
Deputies (to which a number of Bills regarding share ownership by 
employees have been presented), which commissioned the report as a 
fact-finding investigation of implementation of Law N° 58, 1998. 
Without going into any detail regarding the problems of delegating 
votes to associations of shareholding employees, (about which the reader 
is obviously referred to the Report itself), it is worthwhile pointing out the 
two main drawbacks that the current proxy mechanism presents, 
drawbacks which are analysed in the Report. 
a) The first drawback derives from the legal provision regarding   
shareholders’ associations, according to which these associations vote, 
“even in a diverging manner, in compliance with the indications 
expressed in the proxy form by each member” (Art. 141, par. 4).  The 
possibility of a diverging vote clearly runs the risk of undermining the 
voice of shareholding employees’ associations at shareholders’ meetings; 
as the Report states, for these associations “to represent a real 
counterbalance to major shareholders, they should appear from the 
outside to be compact structures”, that is, they should express a 
homogeneous vote.  
It should be recalled that the above-mentioned Pizzinato Bill (n. 18 S) 
proposes that an association delegated to vote on behalf of shareholding 
employees should exercise  its function “on the basis of the prevailing 
orientations of the association” (Art. 3, par. 3) and this provision 
obviously tends towards eliminating any possibility of a divergent vote. 
The Bill also eliminates the equation of shareholders’ associations and 
associations of shareholding employees, proposing to create an 
autonomous “association of shareholding employees” , suggesting 
                                          
24 To be found at: http://www.autostradeazionisti.it FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SHARE OWNERSHIP 11 
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different criteria for its constitution than the general regulations laid down 
by Art. 141, Law N°  58, 1998 (Art.2).  
The differentiation made is certainly an appreciable one: it gives 
appropriate weight to the different interests shareholding employees may 
have as compared with other possible minority groups of shareholders. In 
fact – unlike other minority shareholders, mostly with short-term 
interests (almost always linked to the profitability of investing in shares) 
– shareholding employees may well share some of the interests typical of 
entrepreneurial-capitalistic shareholders: long-term interests linked to 
the success and maximisation of productivity and company profits. This is 
the case above all when workers are not allowed to transfer their shares 
for a certain period of time, that is, when they are bound by stability 
mechanisms to remain shareholders for minimum periods, which are not 
usually short (three years is the period usually laid down in share 
ownership schemes offered by Italian companies in the last few years25).  
b) The second drawback of the current proxy mechanism – again 
highlighted by the Report – concerns the formalities and time required to 
collect the proxies (certification of the deposit and thus ownership of 
shares; the compilation of proxy forms and transmission to Consob (the 
Italian securities and exchange regulator, etc…). This takes an extremely 
long time which is  “difficult to compress in the interval between the date 
on which the shareholders’ meeting is called and that on which it is 
actually held”  26. 
Here again the Pizzinato Bill proposes useful solutions, simplifying the 
procedures for collecting proxies: for example, it accepts digital 
signatures to delegate votes and self-certification to demonstrate 
possession of shares as an alternative to bank certification of share 
deposits (Art. 3, par. 4 and 5). 
One last proposal for more active participation by shareholding 
employees’ associations in the life of companies deserves attention. 
It is contained in both the  Pizzinato Bill (Art. 6), and the expert Report 
mentioned previously 27, and consists of giving associations of 
shareholding employees rights typical of trade union representations: the 
right to premises in which to hold their meetings (Art. 27, Law N° 300, 
1970) and the right to advertise them (Art. 25, Law N° 300, 1970).     
Once more, the proposal is an appreciable one: the conferring of rights 
similar to those of trade union representations facilitates the pursuit of 
certain aims typical of associations of shareholding employees. These 
                                          
25 For justification of a general differentiation between treatment of shareholding employees 
and other minority shareholders, see:  ALAIMO, 1998, pp. 203-211. 
26 Report, cit. p. 10. 
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aims are clearly listed in the statutes and mainly consist of affording 
general protection of the interests of the members and promoting greater 
participation for them in strategic decisions made by their companies. 
Obviously, being able to summon and meet shareholding employees in 
the workplace would give these associations the opportunity to provide 
their members with information about the topics to be discussed in 
shareholders’ meetings and facilitate the collection of proxies.  
 
6. Specific  representation  of shareholding employees 
on boards of directors and auditors’ committees: 
between labour law and company law.  
Finally, passing from employee participation and voting rights in 
shareholders’ meetings to participation by their specific representatives in 
board meetings and auditing committees, it should first be pointed out 
that there are as yet no legal provisions to regulate the situation. 
It is no coincidence that the intention of allowing specific 
representatives of shareholding employees to take part in boards of 
directors and auditors, expressed in the late 90s in a series of collective 
agreements concerning f. p. by workers 28, has in many cases remained a 
“dead letter”, on account of the difficulty of identifying the technical and 
legal modalities for their appointment. In company law there is, in fact, a 
fundamental principle whereby shareholders’ meetings are entitled to 
appoint directors and auditors (Arts. 2383, par. 1, and 2400, par. 1, Civil 
Code). The logical consequence of this principle is that the appointment 
of directors and auditors cannot be devolved to specific subjects (such as 
associations of shareholding employees, for example) or specific 
categories of shares.  
It is true that, according to Art. 2368 of the Civil Code, company 
statutes may contain “special clauses”  regarding appointments to 
company offices, and so it is possible to facilitate the appointment  of 
representatives of minority shareholders on the board of directors and 
auditing committees. It is also true, however, that the legitimacy of these 
clauses is not clear even to commercial law, although the prevailing idea 
is that, in order not to exceed the limits of legitimacy, they should “only 
contribute towards shaping the decisions of the shareholders’ meeting, 
not deprive it of authority”; they should, that is, preserve the meeting’s 
formal power to appoint directors and auditors29. Therefore clauses that 
                                          
28 Cf. above-mentioned Alitalia agreements, 1996 and 1998; Meridiana agreement, 1997 
and Dalmine agreement, 2000. 
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devolve the nomination of board and committee members to specific 
subjects or specific categories of shares are illegal; those which provide, 
within shareholders’ meetings, for voting systems such as to ensure 
minority shareholders of access for their representatives to the board of 
directors and auditing committees (voting by list, scaled votes, 
cumulative votes etc…) are legal 30. 
  There are, on the other hand, a number of bills that have been 
presented to the current government, providing for the participation of 
specific representatives of shareholding employees in company 
organisms31 . And it is obvious that, despite that fact that the rule 
whereby the shareholders’ meeting is responsible for appointing directors 
and auditors is a cardinal principle of the legal set-up of joint stock 
companies, a future law on share ownership by employees could  – as a 
source of the same rank – introduce derogations from this fundamental 
rule. So legal provision for specific representation of shareholding 
workers on the board of directors (and possibly auditing committees) 
might also pivot on a mechanism of appointment outside the 
shareholders’ meeting. 
It should, however, be pointed out that  – if we neglect the various 
bills currently being examined by the two branches of Parliament – there 
are no visible signs in this direction in the legislation recently passed 
concerning company law.   
There is, for example,  no reference to specific representatives of 
shareholding employees in Law N. 366, 3
rd October 2001, which 
delegates the reform of company law to the Government.  
It is therefore legitimate to hold that any proposal concerning the 
participation of representatives of shareholding employees on boards of 
directors and auditing committees should cross the threshold of at least 
two significant issues connected with company law.  
The first concerns the legal treatment of minority shareholders and the 
possibility of legislative perpetration of forms of discrimination between 
one minority and another: a legislator attempting to support the minority 
of shareholding employees may be accused of constitutional illegitimacy 
                                          
30 For an in-depth treatment of the subject, see ALAIMO (1998), pp. 200-201, text and notes.  
31 Bill 2023 C (AN), which provides for “the exercise of collective representation in company 
organisms” (Art. 1, c. 1, letter a), n. 4); Bill C 1003 (AN), submitted to the Chamber on 21
st 
June 2001, which provides for the nomination of 2 or 3 board members by shareholding 
employees (Art.1); Bill n. 18, submitted by Senator Pizzinato and others – which provides 
for the nomination of representatives of shareholding employees on auditing committees 
(Art. 5).  
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in the form of discrimination between different categories of shareholding 
minorities. 
The second issue – a no less important one – is the probable future 
revision of the models of management and control of joint stock 
companies laid down by Law n. 366, 2001 (Art. 4, par. 8). As an 
alternative to the current system – which hinges on the presence of a 
board of directors and a committee of auditors – the law allows for a 
different arrangement of company organisms (a management board and 
a supervisory board or, alternatively, a board of directors within which a 
management control committee is nominated). It is evident that any 
legislation regarding the participation of specific representatives of 
shareholding employees will inevitably have to take these possible 
legislative reforms of the organic structure of joint stock companies into 
account. 
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Updating note: Soon after the writing of this working paper the 
Commission adopted  the Communication “On the Framework for the 
Promotion of Employee Financial Participation” [COM (2002) 364 final]. 
The Communication – which can be consulted on the following Internet 
page: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial /labour/ 
index_en.htm –  has three main objectives: 1) to provide orientation  for 
the further development of employee f.p. in Europe; 2) to promote a 
greater use of employee f.p. schemes across Europe by presenting a 
framework for Community action for the years 2002-2004; 3) to address 
the transnational obstacles which currently impede the introduction of 
European-wide f.p. schemes, proposing concrete actions for overcoming 
them. It contains, in conformity to the objectives above mentioned, a 
series of general principles for f.p. (voluntary participation,  extension of 
the benefits of the f.p. to all employees extending the benefits of f.p. to 
all employees; clear, transparent and predefined formula;  regularity of  
f.p. schemes; avoidance of unreasonable risks for employees; distinction 
between wages, salaries and incomes from f.p. schemes; compatibility 
with worker mobility); it considers the profile of the main obstacles to the 
use and development of employee f.p. at a transnational level and 
examines, finally, the perspectives  of a wider dissemination of f.p.  
 